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In Honor of Professor John Gaubatz: The
Fundamentals of Ethically Representing
Multiple Clients in Estate Planning
JOHN R. PRICE*
As law professors, John Gaubatz and I shared many things, includ-
ing a love of teaching, an appreciation of the broad pedagogic value of
the basic law-school course on wills and trusts, and a fascination with
the ethical problems that confront estate planners.' The opportunity to
talk about these things with John, and to socialize with John and his wife
Kathy,' were among the main reasons I looked forward to participating
in the programs of the University of Miami's Institute on Estate Plan-
ning3 and teaching ethics in the Graduate Program in Estate Plan-
* Professor of Law Emeritus and Dean Emeritus, University of Washington School of Law.
1. Professor Gaubatz graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in 1964 and
began his teaching career in 1971 at Case Western Reserve University Law School, where he also
served a stint as an Associate Dean. In 1976 he taught at the University of Miami School of Law
as a visiting professor and Associate Director of the Institute on Estate Planning. In 1977 he
accepted a permanent position on the University of Miami law faculty, where he served as
Associate Dean from 1977 through 1980. Being an accommodating sort, over his career Professor
Gaubatz taught a wide range of courses, including Employee Benefit Plans, Introduction to Law,
Legal Method, Federal Taxation, Patents, and Wills and Trusts. He was also the author or co-
author of a number of books, including ones on wills and trusts, taxation, and moot court. Perhaps
most important to the practicing bar, Professor Gaubatz directed the University of Miami's
Graduate Program in Estate Planning from 1983 through 1992, and he directed the Philip E.
Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning from 1983 until 1994.
2. Kathy Gaubatz has always been an active contributor to the intellectual, social, and
political life of the Gaubatz household. Kathy helped plan, and participated in, events sponsored
by the Institute on Estate Planning during the period John served as Director. She was, in
addition, fully engaged in the life of the Institute, the law school, and the broader community. The
breadth of Kathy's interests is indicated by her long service as a volunteer at the Fairchild
Botanical Gardens and her candidacy for election to the City Council of Coral Gables.
3. The idea that the University of Miami School of Law should sponsor an extensive annual
educational program on estate planning was perhaps the most creative contribution that Professor
Philip E. Heckerling made to legal education. "Phil," as Professor Heckerling was known to
almost everyone, was the founding Director of the Institute on Estate Planning, a position he held
from the first Institute in 1967 until his untimely death in November 1982. In recognition of
Professor Heckerling's vision and many contributions to the Institute, beginning with the
eighteenth Institute in 1984, it was renamed the Philip E. Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning.
The Institute, now in its forty-second year as of January 2008, regularly attracts 2500 or more
attendees from the United States and several foreign countries. As the late Willard Pedrick wrote
in his tribute to Phil in the dedication of the eighteenth Institute, "[tihe Institute is beyond doubt
the finest, the most effective continuing education program for estate planners in the world."
Willard H. Pedrick, To Philip E. Heckerling We Dedicate the 18th Annual Institute of the
University of Miami Institute on Estate Planning, 18 PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN.
ix (1984). If anything, the size, importance, and value of the Institute continued to grow during
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ning.4 Because we were both interested in how legal ethics affect estate
planning, I am pleased, in John's memory, to contribute this primer on
the joint representation of multiple clients, particularly husbands and
wives, in the same estate-planning matter.
Joint representation in estate planning can occur in a variety of con-
texts other than the representation of husbands and wives, including the
multigenerational representation of family members, the representation
of multiple beneficiaries of a trust or estate, and the representation of
multiple fiduciaries of a trust or estate. This article first gives considera-
tion to the propriety of representing multiple clients in estate planning
and to the various ways in which they might be represented. It also
includes a discussion about the practicalities of representing multiple cli-
ents in estate planning and the impact of the recent changes in the form
of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Rules") regarding confidentiality of client information and conflicts of
interest.5 Emphasis is given to the importance of adequately informing
clients about the consequences of a multiple representation and to the
use of engagement letters. Although the article will generally focus on
the Model Rules, a lawyer's ethical duties are, of course, governed by
the period it was directed by Professor Gaubatz between 1983 and 1994 and since Tina Portuondo
became the Director in 1995.
4. The first paper I presented at the Institute was for the fourteenth Institute in 1980. See
John R. Price, The Uses and Abuses of Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts, 14 INST. ON EST. PLAN.
1100 (1980). From 1981 through 2004, I served on the advisory committee of the Institute, and
I currently remain an emeritus member. In 1994, 2003, and 2004, I taught ethics in the Graduate
Program in Estate Planning.
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007) (confidentiality of information); id. R.
1.7 (conflicts of interest between current clients). References in this paper to the "Model Rules"
are to the 2007 edition of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In 2002 Rule 1.7 was
restructured and revised, and modest changes were made to Rule 1.6. See ABA, ETHICS 2000
COMM'N: REPORT ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 20-36 (2002), http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/e2k/10-85rem.pdf [hereinafter ETHICS 2000 COMM'N REPORT]. Among other
things, the changes in Rule 1.7 and the accompanying comments appear to relax somewhat the
rules regarding waivers of future conflicts of interest. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436 (2005), withdrawing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-372 (1993). More important changes in Rule 1.6 were adopted in
August 2003 with the addition of subparagraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3). Compare MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)-(4) (2002), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(1)-(6) (2003). These subparagraphs had been rejected when they were proposed for
adoption as part of the Model Rules in 1983 by the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission and on
several other occasions. See Pamela Atkins & Joan C. Rogers, ABA Task Force Revised
Recommendations on Model Rule Changes Generally Welcomed, 19 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL
ON PROF'L CONDUCT 263 (2003). They were finally adopted in 2003 as recommended by the
ABA's Task Force on Corporate Responsibility. ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILrrY 52 (2003). The recommendations of the Task Force were made in response to the
collapse of Enron and numerous other public companies. See id. at 2.
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the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer practices, which often
differ from the Model Rules.
I. SOME BACKGROUND REGARDING THE MODEL RULES
(SPECIFICALLY RULES 1.6 AND 1.7)
Before considering the ethical aspects of jointly representing multi-
ple clients, it may be helpful to provide a bit of background regarding
some aspects of the Model Rules. First, as indicated above, what is said
about a Model Rule doesn't necessarily apply to the corresponding rule
in any particular jurisdiction. The Model Rules are just that-a rela-
tively comprehensive set of ethical rules that can be used by a local
jurisdiction as the starting point from which to formulate ethical rules
that best meet its needs.6 Although some forms of the confidentiality
and conflict rules, Model Rules 1.6 and 1.7, are in effect in most states,
they usually differ from the ABA version to some extent.7 Second, the
duty of confidentiality imposed by the ethical rules governing lawyers is
broader in scope than the evidentiary privilege that shields communica-
tions between a lawyer and client from involuntary disclosure.8 Unlike
the evidentiary privilege, which only applies to confidential communica-
tions between a lawyer and client, the ethical rule applies "to all infor-
mation relating to the representation, whatever its source.' 9 Third, the
form of Model Rule 1.6 originally adopted by the ABA House of Dele-
gates in 1983 was more restrictive than its predecessors under the ABA
6. As stated in the Chair's Introduction to the promulgation of the Model Rules in 1983,
[t]he Model Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to serve as a national
framework for implementation of standards of professional conduct .... And the
Model Rules, like all model legislation, will be subject to modification at the level
of local implementation. Viewed as a whole, however, the Model Rules represent a
responsible approach to the ethical practice of law and are consistent with
professional obligations imposed by other law, such as constitutional, corporate,
tort, fiduciary, and agency law.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Chairman's Introduction (1983).
7. For example, according to former ABA President Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., as of 2003 forty-
one states had adopted forms of the confidentiality rule that differ from Model Rule 1.6 as to
whether a lawyer may disclose client information to prevent a crime or fraud. See Atkins &
Rogers, supra note 5.
8. The distinction between the ethical rule and the evidentiary privilege is described as
follows:
The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer
to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, unlike the
evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or
the fact that others share the knowledge .... A lawyer owes an obligation to advise
the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely to assert the privilege unless it
is waived by the client.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILiTY EC 4-4 (1983).
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2007).
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Canons of Professional Ethics and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. In particular, the original form of Rule 1.6 prohibited
disclosures of a client's crime or fraud, whereas the prior versions of the
ABA confidentiality rule either permitted or required a lawyer to make
such disclosures. Specifically, the Canons of Professional Ethics,
adopted in 1908, permitted, and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, which replaced the Canons in 1969, required a lawyer to
disclose confidential information regarding frauds perpetrated by a client
on either a third party or a tribunal. °
With two very narrow exceptions, Rule 1.6(a), as adopted in 1983,
prohibited a lawyer from disclosing information relating to the represen-
tation of a client without the client's consent or the implied authorization
of the client." In most cases, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to consult
10. The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics provided that
[w]hen a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced,
which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify
it; at first by advising his client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus
unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that
they may take appropriate steps.
ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHics Canon 41 (1928). Model Code provision DR 7-102(B) required
a lawyer to disclose client fraud in some cases:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his
client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal ....
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall
promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSiBILrrY DR 7-102(B) (1969). In 1974, DR 7-102(B)(1) was
weakened by adding at its end the words "except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication." R.W. Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality,
41 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 421, 431-33 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, as
pointed out by Nahstoll, "[tlhe 1974 amendment was adopted by only seventeen states and one of
these, Pennsylvania, is about to repeal it." Id. at 433. According to an opinion issued by the
ABA,
the duty imposed by DR 7-102(B) [as amended in 1974] would remain in force if
the information clearly establishing a fraud on a person or tribunal and committed
by a client in the course of representation were obtained by the lawyer from a third
party (but not in connection with his professional relationship with the client),
because it would not be a confidence or secret of a client entitled to confidentiality.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
11. In its original form, Model Rule 1.6(a) provided as follows: "A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation,
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and
except as stated in paragraph (b)." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1983). As noted
supra note 5, in August 2002 the ABA House of Delegates adopted relatively minor changes to
Rule 1.6, and in August 2003 the house of delegates adopted subparagraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3),
which added two major exceptions to Rule 1.6. The exceptions were included in the form of the
Model Rules proposed by the commission charged with fashioning a set of rules to replace the
Model Code. The exceptions were deleted from Rule 1.6 in 1983 when it was originally
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with a client's financial advisors and, in some cases, the client's physi-
cians. However, the limits of what a lawyer is impliedly authorized to
disclose are unclear-which may be helpful in some cases. Note also
that a change that is beneficial to the adequate representation of elderly
clients was made to Rule 1.14 in 2002.12 This welcome change permits
a lawyer to disclose information regarding a client with diminished
capacity to the extent necessary to protect the client's interests.
13
The first exception to Rule 1.6's general ban on the disclosure of
client information, subparagraph (b)(1), permitted a lawyer to disclose
client information "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substan-
tial bodily harm."' 4 In 2002 the exception of subparagraph (b)(1) was
liberalized by eliminating the predicate of client criminality and the
requirement of immediacy.' 5 The amendment replaced the requirement
that conditioned a lawyer's right to disclose client information on a
belief that the client's act "is likely to result in imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm"'16 with language that allows disclosure to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary "to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm."' 7 The second original exception, sub-
paragraph (b)(2), allowed a lawyer to disclose client information in a
controversy between the lawyer and client to establish a defense in a
criminal or civil claim based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations concerning the representation of
the client.' 8 Neither of the original exceptions had much relevance in
considered by the house of delegates. According to former ABA President Alfred P. Carlton, Jr.,
the changes adopted in 2003 had been rejected five times since 1983. See Atkins & Rogers, supra
note 5.
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(c) & cmt. 1 (2007); see also EmIcs 2000
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5, at 59 (2002) (indicating the addition of subsection (c) to Model
Rule 1.14 by the Ethics 2000 Commission in 2002).
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(c) (2007).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983). The version adopted in some
states permits a lawyer to disclose client information to prevent the client from committing "a
crime." E.g., WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2006).
15. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) ("[T]o prevent the
client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death
or substantial bodily harm ...."), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007)
("[T]o prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm ....").
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (emphasis added).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (1983). The specific language of
subparagraph (b)(2) allows disclosures "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in
a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client." This
exception is established in subparagraph (b)(5) in the current version of the Rule 1.6. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2007).
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the estate-planning context.
The primacy of the duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6 is
emphasized in some ABA ethics opinions, which in effect hold that the
requirement of confidentiality trumps the other duties of a lawyer. 19
Although disclosure is not permitted by Rule 1.6, a lawyer who is aware
of a client's crime or fraud may or may not be required to withdraw
from the representation.2 ° Some authorities recognize that the lawyer
may do so in a manner that may, depending on the degree of their
sophistication, alert others to the client's misconduct.2' As illustrated by
the following example, which is based on Florida Ethics Opinion 95-4,
if a co-client directs a lawyer not to disclose information to the other
client that would allow the other client to protect his or her interests, the
lawyer may not disclose the information directly, but may withdraw in a
manner calculated to alert the other client to the problem:
Lawyer ("L") recently helped long-time clients, Husband ("H") and
Wife ("W"), update their estate plans, including the preparation of
wills under which each is the principal beneficiary of the other's will.
H later met alone with L to discuss the effect of a codicil to his will,
which another law firm prepared, that gives a significant portion of
his estate to a woman with whom he has been having an extramarital
relationship. In particular, H asked L to advise him regarding the
extent of W's right of election if she were to survive him. L should
ask H to disclose his plan to W because of the substantial adverse
effect it will have on her. If H refuses to tell W and directs L not to
inform W of H's plan, the pre-2003 version of Rule 1.6 bars L from
informing W about the codicil.22 L may no longer represent H or W.
L must also inform them of his or her withdrawal. Note that, depend-
ing on the certainty and substantiality of the prospective economic
injury to W, disclosure may be permitted by Rule 1.6(b)(2), which
was added in 2003.23
According to Florida Ethics Opinion 95-4, in withdrawing from the rep-
resentation, the lawyer (L in the foregoing example) may inform W that
19. E.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994). This
ruling concludes that the lawyer for a fiduciary may not disclose crimes or frauds committed by
the fiduciary. Id. As noted in the opinion, the version of Rule 1.6 in effect in some states would
allow or require the lawyer for a fiduciary to make limited disclosures of misconduct by the
fiduciary. See id. The opinion states that "if the fiduciary insists on continuing a course of
fraudulent or criminal conduct, the lawyer may be required to terminate the representation because
the lawyer's services will be involved in that conduct, so as to invoke Rule 1.16(a)(1), or may
have the option of a voluntary withdrawal under Rule 1.16(b)(l)." Id. (citation omitted).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2007) sets forth the rules regarding the
termination of a representation.
21. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Prof I Ethics Comm., Op. 95-4 (1997).
22. See id.
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2007).
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"a conflict of interest has arisen that precludes Lawyer's continued rep-
resentation of Wife and Husband in these matters. 24 Such disclosure
may or may not arouse W's suspicions sufficiently for her to take some
protective action. 25 The Florida opinion concludes by saying that
[t]he committee recognizes that a sudden withdrawal by Lawyer
almost certainly will raise suspicions on the part of Wife. This may
even alert Wife to the substance of the separate confidence. Regard-
less of whether such surmising by Wife occurs when Lawyer gives
notice of withdrawal, Lawyer nevertheless has complied with the
Rules of Professional Conduct and has not violated Lawyer's duties
to Husband.26
If the obligation to maintain confidentiality is absolute, as recited in
some ethics opinions, how is it that L is permitted to do by indirection
(i.e., alert W to misconduct by H) that which L is forbidden to do
directly?
The form of Rule 1.6 in effect in New Jersey and a few other juris-
dictions allows a lawyer to disclose a client's crime or fraud to the
extent reasonably necessary to rectify the effect of the crime or fraud on
another person, regardless of the substantiality of the economic effect on
the other person.27 Under the facts of the foregoing example, in such a
jurisdiction L would be permitted to inform W directly about H's
codicil.28
II. LIBERALIZATION OF RULE 1.6
In August 2003 the ABA House of Delegates narrowly adopted two
significant changes in the confidentiality rule, Rule 1.6.29 The amend-
ments changed Rule 1.6(b) to allow a lawyer to disclose client informa-
tion to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent,
mitigate, or rectify crimes or frauds by a client that are reasonably cer-
tain to result, or have resulted, in substantial financial harm to a third
person in furtherance of which the lawyer's services were used.3 °
Although the changed rule continues significantly to restrict a lawyer's
right to disclose a crime or fraud committed by a client, the modest
24. Fla. Bar Prof I Ethics Comm., Op. 95-4 (1997).
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)-(d) (2007); see infra note 40.
28. The outcome would depend on whether L's services were implicated in the fraud because
H consulted L regarding the effect of the codicil.
29. See ABA Amends Ethics Rules on Confidentiality, Corporate Clients, To Allow More
Disclosures, 19 ABAIBNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT 467 (2003).
30. The amendments were passed by a small margin, 218-201, after several hours of debate.
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liberalization achieved by the changes is welcome. 3'
As amended, subparagraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) permit, but do not
require, a lawyer to disclose client information:
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial inter-
ests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has
used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or
has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in fur-
therance of which the client has used the lawyer's services ... 32
According to Rule 1.6, Comment 15, a lawyer's decision not to disclose
information is not subject to review: "A lawyer's decision not to dis-
close as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this Rule."33
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ("Restate-
ment") adopts a similar approach.34 Under it, a lawyer's decision
whether to disclose client information to prevent reasonably certain
death or serious bodily harm 35 or to prevent or mitigate a crime or fraud
that threatens substantial financial loss 36 is not in itself subject to disci-
pline or imposition of damages.37 Despite those statements, a person
who is injured by a crime or fraud may decide to pursue an action
against a lawyer who did not disclose information that might have
allowed the injured party to have avoided the injury or to rectify its
commission. Specifically, an injured party may seek to recover damages
from a lawyer who fails to make a disclosure permitted by subparagraph
(b)(2) or (b)(3).
Unfortunately, both subparagraphs condition the discretionary right
to make disclosures on imponderables-the certainty that an injury will
occur and its substantiality. Neither Rule 1.6 nor the comments to it
provide any insight as to how the substantiality of a financial injury
should be determined.38 Assuming that substantiality is a relative term,
a lawyer may need to know the economic circumstances of an injured
31. Query whether a client who uses a lawyer's services to any extent in committing a crime
or fraud has forfeited any right to be protected by the duty of confidentiality.
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2007).
33. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 15.
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNNG LAWYERS §§ 66-67 (2000).
35. See id. § 66.
36. See id. § 67.
37. See id. § 66 cmt. g; id. § 67 cmt. h.
38. Consistently, the Model Rules do not provide any guidance with respect to the
determination of whether a gift to a lawyer is substantial for the purpose of Rule 1.8(c), which
prohibits a lawyer from soliciting a "substantial gift" from an unrelated client. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(c) (2007).
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party. For example, a loss of $25,000 might be insubstantial to the law-
yer or an affluent person, but very substantial to a person of modest
means. The requirement that an economic injury be substantial should
be satisfied if the injury is substantial from the perspective of either the
miscreant (the client) or the victim (or victims). Insofar as economic
injuries are concerned, it would be preferable for the right to disclose to
depend on whether a lawyer reasonably believes that a client would
commit, or had committed, a crime or fraud that would cause another
party to suffer a financial injury-which is the rule in some states.
Variations of the exceptions, which differ widely in their details,
are in effect in most states.39 For example, some states allow a lawyer to
disclose client information to the extent necessary to prevent a client or
another person from committing a crime.40 This might be invoked, for
example, to prevent one co-client from embezzling from another. Other
states require a lawyer to disclose information that clearly establishes a
criminal or fraudulent act of a client in which the lawyer's services were
involved to the extent necessary to rectify the consequences of the act
where the act resulted in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another person.41 For example, in such a jurisdiction, the
lawyer for a fiduciary might be required to disclose a fraud by the fidu-
ciary that caused substantial economic losses and involved the services
of the lawyer. As indicated above, still other states permit disclosures of
client information to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal, ille-
gal, or fraudulent act in which the lawyer's services were used regard-
less of the substantiality of injuries that resulted from it.42 Consistent
with the current text of Rule 1.6(b), a large number of states allow dis-
closures of client information to be made to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud that is likely to
result in death, substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to the finan-
39. As stated in the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct,"[t]he ethics rules
in most jurisdictions contain some similar exception to the confidentiality rule permitting or even
requiring a lawyer to disclose information in order to prevent and/or rectify the consequences of a
crime or fraud that injures the financial or property interests of another. The details vary greatly
from state to state, with almost as many versions as there are jurisdictions." ABA/BNA
LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT: PRACTICE GUIDE, DISCLOSURE: CRIMES AND FRAUDS
§ 55:901 (2008).
40. E.g., OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2006); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2006). This rule is consistent with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980).
41. E.g., HAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2005).
42. E.g., N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6(c) (2003). The New Jersey version of Rule 1.6
was involved in A v. B. v. Hill Wallack, 726 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1999). In Hill Wallack, the New
Jersey Supreme Court gave a broad construction to "the term 'fraudulent act' within the meaning
of RPC 1.6(c)." Id. at 927.
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cial interests or property of another.43
The following example, based upon A. v. B. v. Hill Wallack,' illus-
trates the limited circumstances in which disclosures are permitted under
subparagraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3):
Law Firm ("LF") represented Husband ("H") and Wife ("W") in
estate-planning in connection with which H and W signed letters,
captioned "Waiver of Conflict of Interest," which stated that "infor-
mation provided by one spouse could become available to the other."
LF prepared wills for H and W, under which the residuary estate of a
deceased spouse would pass to the survivor of them. If there were no
survivor, the residuary estate of the deceased spouse would pass to
the testator's issue, which would include a testator's illegitimate chil-
dren. LF was later retained to represent a single woman ("M") to
pursue a patemity action against H. Because of a clerical error LF
was initially unaware of the conflict in agreeing to represent M
against H. When LF learned of the conflict, it withdrew from repre-
senting M and informed H that it believed it was ethically obligated
to inform W that under her current estate plan, her estate might pass
to H's illegitimate child. H sought a court order prohibiting LF from
making the disclosure.
In Hill Wallack, the court allowed the firm to inform the wife of H's
illegitimate child.45 Although the conflict letters signed by H and W
appeared to allow disclosure, the court did not rely on them.4 6 Instead,
the court relied on a specific exception in the New Jersey version of
Rule 1.6. 47 Relevant to the way in which subparagraphs (b)(2) and
(b)(3) will be applied, the court concluded that disclosure was not per-
mitted by New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct ("RPC") 1.6(b)(3),
which allows disclosures in order to rectify crimes or frauds that may
cause substantial injury to the financial interests of another.48 The court
reasonably concluded that "[t]he possible inheritance of the wife's estate
by the husband's illegitimate child is too remote to constitute 'substan-
tial injury to the financial interest or property of another' within the
meaning of RPC 1.6(b). ' 49 Assuming the correctness of that conclusion,
disclosure of the facts would have been improper under Model Rule
1.6.5o The opinion upheld disclosure under New Jersey RPC 1.6(c),
which permits disclosures "to rectify the consequences of a client's
43. E.g., MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2005).
44. 726 A.2d 924.
45. See id. at 932.
46. See id. at 928.
47. See id. at 927-28.
48. See id. at 927.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 928.
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criminal, illegal or fraudulent act in furtherance of which the lawyer's
services had been used.""1 In addition to illustrating the importance of
the exact phraseology of the exceptions to Rule 1.6, the Hill Wallack
case demonstrates the necessity that firms maintain an accurate conflicts
database and the importance of carefully expressing the extent to which
multiple clients agree that confidential information will, or may be,
shared among them.
III. JOINT REPRESENTATION OF MULTIPLE CLIENTS
IN ESTATE PLANNING
In a joint representation (which is also referred to as common rep-
resentation), one lawyer represents multiple clients in the same matter
and is, expressly or impliedly, authorized to share all material informa-
tion regarding the representation. That is, in a joint representation, there
is no confidentiality as between clients with regard to information that is
material to the representation. 52 Also, importantly, the lawyer owes
each client identical duties of loyalty and impartiality.53 Before under-
taking a joint representation, a lawyer should explain the lack of confi-
dentiality between the parties and other implications of a joint
representation, which should be confirmed in an engagement letter.
Most authorities and commentators agree that the joint representation of
multiple clients, such as a husband and wife, is ethically proper if there
51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)
(2003).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 31 (2007).
53. Id. (stating that in a joint representation, the lawyer "has an equal duty of loyalty to each
clients"). A lawyer is also "required to be impartial between commonly represented clients." Id.
cmt. 29. The duty to share information may exist by reason of an express agreement of the parties
or by default. According to Restatement § 130, Comment b, "multiple representation not
involving litigation requires a lawyer to remain loyal to clients and protect their confidential
information." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 130 cmt. b (2000).
Section 75, Comment d provides that "[riules governing the co-client privilege are premised on an
assumption that co-clients usually understand that all information is to be disclosed to all of them.
Courts sometimes refer to this as a presumed intent that there should be no confidentiality between
co-clients." Id. § 75 cmt. d. As stated in the ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct,
"[i]n the absence of any agreement to the contrary (usually in writing), a lawyer is
presumed to represent multiple clients with regard to related legal matters jointly
with resulting full sharing of information between the clients. The better practice in
all cases is to memorialize the clients' instructions in writing and give a copy of the
writing to the client."
AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 75 (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter ACTEC COMMENTARIES]. The ACTEC
Commentaries were first adopted by the Regents of the American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel in 1993. Your author was the Reporter for, and the principal author of, the first and
second editions of the ACTEC Commentaries, which were adopted in 1993 and 1995 respectively.
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are no disabling conflicts and none is likely to arise.54 A joint represen-
tation may, of course, be terminated by one or more of the clients or by
subsequent changes in the circumstances (e.g., a nonwaivable conflict
intervenes). Following the termination of a joint representation a lawyer
may continue to represent one of the clients if doing so is permissible
under Rule 1.9 and Comment 21 to Rule 1.7.
Apart from ethical considerations, a joint representation is gener-
ally more efficient and economical. This conclusion is supported by an
ABA opinion, which observed that "[c]onsiderable efficiency is gained
through having one lawyer or firm manage the legal affairs of all family
members. The firm learns about family businesses, assets, documents,
and personalities and thus is able to provide quality representation
requiring less time."56 Additional advantages were pointed out by Pro-
fessor Teresa Collett: "The advantages of joint representation include
pooled information, pooled resources, cost savings, coclient support,
commitment to the collective good, presentation of a united front, and
reducing the drain on judicial resources. 57 A joint representation does
involve some risks, including the possibility that the representation of
both parties will have to be abandoned if a serious conflict arises during
the course of the representation. 58 However, in my experience, if a law-
yer exercises reasonable care in screening for conflicts and other possi-
bly troublesome issues, it is unlikely that a joint representation will
encounter any serious problems.
At the initial meeting, a lawyer who is asked to represent multiple
clients in the same matter should also attempt to determine whether, and
to what extent, the interests of the parties conflict. While it is prudent
for a lawyer to discuss potential conflicts of interest and confidentiality
concerns at the initial meeting with a husband and wife, as stated in a
1997 Florida ethics opinion, the lawyer is not required to do so if there is
no objective evidence that their interests conflict. 59 As noted in Com-
54. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. I ("A lawyer
may represent two or more clients in the same matter as co-clients either when there is no conflict
of interest between them (see § 121) or when a conflict exists but the co-clients have adequately
consented (see § 122)."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Conflict of Interest in Estate Planning for
Husband and Wife, 20 PROB. LAW. 1, 5 (1994) ("Continuing concurrent representation in such
circumstances would constitute inadequate representation of the spouse who is inadequately
informed and, as such, would be a violation of the rules of ethics.").
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2007); Id. R. 1.7 cmt 21.
56. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-428 n.2 (2002) (citing
ACTEC COMMENTARIES).
57. Teresa Stanton Collett, The Promise and Peril of Multiple Representation, 16 REV. LnIn.
567, 578 (1997).
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29 (2007).
59. Fla. Bar Prof l Ethics Comm., Op. 95-4 (1997). If a husband and wife appear to be
knowledgeable and there do not appear to be any conflicts, a lawyer may represent them without
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ment 27 to Model Rule 1.7, "conflict questions may arise in estate plan-
ning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare
wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and,
depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be pre-
sent."60 Even if the interests of prospective multiple clients conflict,
many nonlitigation conflicts may be waived by the clients.6 ' Clients can
give an effective waiver only if the requirements of Rule 1.7(b) are met,
which requires that "each affected client gives informed consent, con-
firmed in writing."62
In some instances, an existing or prospective conflict of interest
among multiple parties may be so serious as to preclude a lawyer from
representing them.63 For example, a lawyer is generally unable to
represent multiple parties "where contentious litigation or negotiations
between them are imminent or contemplated."'  Thus, the same lawyer
should generally not represent both parties to a prenuptial agreement or
other matter in which their interests directly conflict to a substantial
degree.65 Similarly, the same lawyer should not represent the personal
representative of a decedent's estate and a creditor or other person who
is pursuing a claim against the estate.66
obtaining any consent from them. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 130 cmt. c (2000).
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 27 (2007).
61. See id. cmt. 28.
62. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4). Comment 18 to Rule 1.7 explains the requirements of informed consent
in the context of conflicts. It reads, in part: "Informed consent requires that each affected client be
aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the
conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client." Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 18.
63. Id. R. 1.7(a).
64. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 29.
65. ACTEC COMMENTARIES, supra note 53, at 93. It is sometimes possible for a lawyer to
represent both parties to a prenuptial agreement or other agreement. For example, a lawyer might
draft a prenuptial agreement with the informed consent of the parties if both parties are lawyers,
they have already agreed to all material terms, and they only ask the lawyer to prepare the
agreement for them or to advise them regarding the federal-tax aspects of the agreement.
66. Id. The same is, of course, true with respect to the representation of a trustee and a person
with a claim against the trust. Some ethics opinions would permit the lawyer to represent a
fiduciary in the fiduciary's representative capacity and personally in taking a position adverse to
the interests of the beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate. E.g., Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 2005-119
(2005); Va. State Bar's Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Informal Op. 1778 (2003). The
Virginia opinion erroneously cites In re Birnbaum, 460 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sur. Ct. 1983) as
supporting its conclusion-which it does not. In fact, the Birnbaum court opined that "where the
attorney represents his client in both capacities, he may not act to advance the personal interests of
a fiduciary in such a way as to harm his other client, the estate." Id. at 707. The Oregon and
Virginia opinions reason that the lawyer only represents a single client-the person who is acting
as a fiduciary, which completely ignores that the person is acting in two different, adverse
capacities. Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 2005-119 (2005); Va. State Bar's Standing Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Informal Op. 1778.
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IV. AVOIDING CONFLICTS BY LIMITING THE SCOPE
OF THE REPRESENTATION
Importantly, the same lawyer may represent multiple clients if the
representation is limited to matters as to which the clients' interests do
not conflict. Under Model Rule 1.2(c), a lawyer may limit the scope of
the representation "if the limitation is reasonable ... and the client gives
informed consent."67 This rule allows a lawyer to represent a client, or
clients, with respect to some matters, but not others. The concept is
illustrated by the following example:
Lawyer ("L") is asked to represent Client ("C") as executor of the
will of Decedent ("D") and to enforce a claim C has against D's
estate. If payment of C's claim is required, the payment would
reduce the residuary estate of which there are several beneficiaries
other than C. L may properly represent C as executor, but L cannot
also represent C in enforcing C's claim against D's estate. The con-
flict, which might result in litigation between C individually and C as
executor, may not be waivable by the beneficiaries of D's residuary
estate.
The existence of a marital or other familial relationship does not
itself involve a conflict of interest that would preclude a lawyer from
jointly representing a husband and wife or other multiple family mem-
bers. 68 In estate planning, the joint representation of parties whose inter-
ests do not seriously conflict is the norm. The joint representation of
clients whose interests did not seriously conflict was encouraged by for-
mer Rule 2.2, which was deleted from the Model Rules in 2002.69
Unanticipated serious conflicts among multiple clients may, of course,
arise during the course of the representation. 7
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2007).
68. For example, a 1996 Montana ethics opinion concluded that
[t]he marital relationship itself is not in most cases adversarial in nature and no
conflict inherently exists in representing both parties. Generally speaking, the fact
that the clients are married does not materially limit the responsibilities to either
client. Therefore, it is not necessary to advise a couple of the possibility of a
potential conflict unless there is evidence suggesting such advisement is
appropriate.
State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 960731 (1996).
69. See ETHICS 2000 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5, at 73-75 (indicating the deletion of Rule
2.2 from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct). Rule 2.2, which discussed the lawyer's role
as an intermediary, was deleted on the theory that the representation of multiple parties was more
appropriately subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. ABA, ETHmcs 2000 COMM'N, RULE 2.2:
REPORTER'S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-
rule22rem.html. Making the shift was also encouraged by the relative relaxation of the rigor of
the conflict rules of Rule 1.7. See id.
70. As stated in Comment 29 to Rule 1.7, "[o]rdinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw
from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCr R. 1.7 cmt. 29 (2007). However, if such a conflict arises the lawyer may continue to
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As illustrated by the following example from the ACTEC Commen-
taries on the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility,7' a lawyer may
properly represent a personal representative both with respect to the
administration of a decedent's estate and regarding a personal matter so
long as the two representations do not conflict:
Example 1.7-2. Lawyer (L) represents Trustee (7) as trustee of a trust
created by X. L may properly represent T in connection with other
matters that do not involve a conflict of interest, such as the prepara-
tion of a will or other personal matters not related to the trust. L
should not charge the trust for any personal services that are per-
formed for T. Moreover, in order to avoid misunderstandings, L
should charge T for any substantial personal services that L performs
for T.
72
The same lawyer may ethically represent the multiple fiduciaries of a
trust or estate so long as their interests do not conflict. Similarly, the
same lawyer may represent multiple beneficiaries of a fiduciary estate,
such as the residuary beneficiaries of an estate. Consistent with the pro-
visions of former Rule 2.2, a lawyer for multiple fiduciaries or benefi-
ciaries may be required to withdraw from the representation if any of the
multiple clients object to the lawyer continuing to represent them.
V. OTHER MODELS FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF MULTIPLE PARTIES
There is one other appropriate way in which multiple clients can be
represented regarding the same estate-planning matter-a completely
separate representation, the main feature of which is that each client is
represented by a separate lawyer. A representation of multiple clients by
separate lawyers does not ordinarily involve any unusual ethical
problems.73 Although a separate representation is almost always more
expensive than if the clients were jointly represented by the same law-
represent one of the clients if the clients gave their advance informed consent. See id. R.
1.7(b)(4).
71. See ACTEC COMMENTARIES, supra note 53.
72. Id. at 93.
73. Ethical issues can, of course, arise in connection with the separate representation of
clients in an estate-planning matter, including issues involving the duty of confidentiality. For
example, Rules 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3) allow a lawyer to reveal client information to the extent
necessary to prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud in which the lawyer's services
were implicated and were reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another party. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2007). For
example, after a lawyer has assisted a husband in planning a transaction that would result in the
wife transferring substantial wealth to the husband, the husband informs the lawyer that as soon as
the transaction is completed he intends to leave his wife and file a dissolution action. In such a
case, if the husband refuses to inform the wife of his intentions, Rule 1.6(b)(2) allows the lawyer
to disclose the husband's intentions to counsel for the wife. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCr R. 1.6 cmt. 7.
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yer, it is appropriate where each client wishes to preserve autonomy,
freedom of action, and confidentiality. Thus, multiple clients might pre-
fer to have separate lawyers if their interests are not entirely congruent
(e.g., they are negotiating the formation of a business entity or the terms
of a prenuptial agreement). Likewise, a husband and wife, both of
whom had been married previously and have differing wishes regarding
the disposition of their property, might prefer to have separate counsel.
Two other ways that multiple clients might be represented by a
single lawyer have been suggested, but they are not widely used. One is
the so-called family model in which one lawyer represents "the family"
as if it were an entity, rather than the individual members of the fam-
ily.74 Professors Thomas Shaffer and Russell Pearce are the principal
proponents of this model.75 Despite having some attractive features,
including the recognition of duties that inhere in a family relationship,76
family representation is neither sanctioned by existing ethical rules nor
is it widely accepted or used.77 The reason is simple: Each family mem-
ber is entitled to recognition, respect, and autonomy-a family is not a
legally recognized entity.78 A lawyer may, of course, represent multiple
members of a family so long as doing so is not barred by the conflicts
rules. It is, for example, common for the same lawyer to advise several
family members regarding their closely held business, their estate plan-
ning, or both.
In the final model, commonly called "separate representation," a
lawyer represents multiple clients pursuant to an agreement that the law-
yer will not disclose any information regarding one client to the other
client without the former client's express consent. Professor Jeffrey
Pennell is the primary advocate for this type of representation.79 While
74. See Russell G. Pearce, Reexamining the Family Values of Legal Ethics, 22 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV.
963, 964-68 (1987); see also Teresa Stanton Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One... Until
the Lawyers Are Done, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 101, 119-24 (1993) (discussing
Professor Shaffer's "lawyers of the family" theory of representation); Russell G. Pearce, Family
Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 1253 (1994) [hereinafter Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics] (generally
discussing entity versus individual representation within families).
75. See sources cited supra note 74.
76. See Shaffer, supra note 74, at 967.
77. See Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics, supra note 74, at 1274 ("[E]stablished legal
ethics doctrine favors the individual over the family unit.").
78. Hazard, supra note 54, at 22 ("Under the law as it stands husband and wife, and other
adult family members as well, are legally autonomous jural persons and must be treated as such in
lawyer-client relationships.").
79. Professor Jeffrey Pennell calls this method the "priestly" approach, which is intended to
protect all disclosures by one client from disclosure to the other. Jeffery N. Pennell, Professional
Responsibility: Reforms Are Needed To Accommodate Estate Planning and Family Counselling
[sic], 25 PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1 1801-05.1 (1991).
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the concept is tangentially supported by dicta in at least one case,80 a
comment in the Restatement, 8I and a New York ethics opinion,82 sepa-
rate representation is not generally considered to be feasible or consis-
tent with the Model Rules. Professor Geoffrey Hazard has condemned
the concept in the strongest terms.83
Although some experienced estate planners separately represent
multiple clients according to this regime, the ACTEC Commentaries
caution that
[a] lawyer who is asked to provide separate representation to multiple
clients should do so with great care because of the stress it necessa-
rily places on the lawyer's duties of impartiality and loyalty and the
extent to which it may limit the lawyer's ability to advise each of the
clients adequately.84
My views regarding the separate representation of clients are expressed
in the following excerpt from the book that I wrote with Samuel A.
Donaldson, entitled Price on Contemporary Estate Planning:
A so-called separate representation is fraught with risk for the
clients and the lawyer. In such a case, how could the lawyer possibly
fulfill his or her duties of competency and loyalty to each client?...
How could a lawyer adequately represent both spouses if he or she
has agreed that the confidences of each would not be disclosed to the
other?
85
As noted by Professor Theresa Collett, "Such 'don't ask, don't tell' poli-
cies appear to be a recipe for professional liability."86
Despite the widespread criticism of the separate-representation
model, a 2003 opinion of the New York State Bar Association indicates
that the separate representation of co-clients is permissible in New
York.87 According to the opinion, "[o]n establishing the attorney-client
relationship, the co-clients may consent to an alternative arrangement.
80. See A v. B. v. Hill Wallack, 726 A.2d 924, 929 (N.J. 1999) ("Similarly, the co-clients can
agree that unilateral confidences or other confidential information will be kept confidential by the
attorney.").
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. 1(2000) ("Co-clients
can also explicitly agree that the lawyer is not to share certain information, such as described
categories of proprietary, financial, or similar information with one or more other co-clients (see
§ 75, Comment d). A lawyer must honor such agreements.").
82. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 761 (2003).
83. Hazard, supra note 54, at 13 ("Let me put the point bluntly. The concept of 'separate
representation' is a legal and ethical oxymoron.").
84. ACTEC COMMENTARIES, supra note 53, at 76.
85. JOHN R. PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING
1-58 (2008 ed. CCH 2007). For a discussion of the risks inherent in such a representation, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 130 reporter's note (2000).
86. Collett, The Promise and Peril, supra note 57, at 578.
87. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 761 (2003).
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The co-clients may specifically agree that the lawyer will not share con-
fidential information if requested by the client providing the
information."88
VI. CLARIFYING THE NATURE OF A REPRESENTATION,
ENGAGEMENT LETTERS
The Model Rules, the Restatement, and the ACTEC Commentaries
all agree that a lawyer who is asked to represent multiple clients should
inform them fully at the outset regarding the ramifications of a joint
representation-particularly regarding confidentiality and conflicts.89 In
some cases, a lawyer should consider meeting separately with the pro-
spective clients, or at least offering each of them the opportunity to do
SO.
90
To reduce the risk of misunderstanding, at the initial meeting with
prospective clients, the lawyer should thoroughly explain to them the
key aspects of the representation, including the scope and terms of the
representation; the timetable for completing each phase of the represen-
tation; the basis upon which the lawyer's fee will be determined; 91 that
confidentiality will be maintained with respect to others, but not as
between the clients; and what will be done if a conflict develops during
88. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 cmt. d. (2000)
("Co-clients may agree that the lawyer will not disclose certain confidential communications of
one co-client to other co-clients.")).
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 31 (2007) ("The lawyer should, at the
outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed
consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to
withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from
the other."); id. cmt. 32 ("Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a
result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the
representation. See Rule 1.2(c)."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 60 (2000) ("When a conflict of interest exists, as part of the process of obtaining consent, the
lawyer is required to inform each co-client of the effect of joint representation upon disclosure of
confidential information .... "); ACTEC COMMENTARIES, supra note 53, at 32 (explaining that
under the general principles of Rule 1.2, "[i]f multiple clients are involved, the lawyer should
discuss with them the scope of the representation and any actual or potential conflicts and
determine the basis upon which the lawyer will undertake the representation.").
90. ACTEC COMMENTARIES, supra note 53, at 32 ("A lawyer may wish to consider meeting
with prospective clients separately, which would give each of them an opportunity to be more
candid and, perhaps, reveal potentially serious conflicts of interest or objectives that would not
otherwise be disclosed."); Hazard, supra note 54, at 23 ("[11f a multiple representation is being
considered separate interviews should be held with each client, more than once if necessary.
Separate interviews can reveal divergences in the clients' respective assumptions and purposes
that otherwise would be masked by polite conversation.").
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2007) requires that the scope of the
representation and the basis upon which the fee will be determined "be communicated to the
client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the
representation."
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the course of the administration. Those matters should be memorialized
in an engagement letter to the clients.92 Any existing conflicts must also
be fully discussed and should be described and appropriately waived in
the engagement letter. Under the liberalized version of Rule 1.7, clients
are more broadly able to waive some future conflicts, although such a
waiver may not be upheld if a completely unanticipated conflict devel-
ops.9 3 The efficacy of a waiver depends largely upon the sophistication
of the client and "the extent to which the client reasonably understands
the material risks that the waiver entails."94 Note that some jurisdictions
require the basis of a lawyer's fee to be communicated in writing to
clients or that there be a written agreement between the lawyer and cli-
ent regarding the lawyer's fee.9 5
An engagement letter for a husband and wife in an estate-planning
matter might look something like the following example:96
Dear Husband and Wife:
Thank you for asking me to assist you with your estate planning,
which I will be pleased to do. The following paragraphs summarize
the agreements we reached at our initial conference regarding our
relationship.
Scope of the representation. We will review relevant informa-
tion, including your existing estate-planning documents; help you
identify your estate-planning goals; explain the various estate-plan-
ning techniques that you might consider using; prepare estimates of
the tax consequences of the plans under consideration; prepare drafts
92. Although most states do not require a lawyer to send a client an engagement letter, it is
good practice to do so. "Engagement letters help clients have more accurate and realistic
expectations regarding the scope of the representation, the time within which the services will be
performed and their cost." John R. Price, 801-2d Conflicts, Confidentiality, and Other Ethical
Considerations in Estate Planning, 801-2d Tax Mgmt. Est., Gifts & Tr. Portfolios (BNA), at A-14
(2007). For a broad sample of forms of engagement letters, see AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE
COUNSEL, ENGAGEMENT LETrERS: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS (1999), available at http://www.
actec.org/publnfoArk/comm/engltrtoc.html. For a form of engagement letter that might be used in
connection with a husband and wife representation, see also PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 85,
at 1-34 to -36.
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2007).
94. Id.
95. E.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2007) (requiring the basis or rate of a
lawyer's fee to be communicated in writing to the client if the lawyer has not regularly
represented the client); CAL. BUS. & PROFESSIONS CODE § 6148(a) (1996) (requiring a written
contract for services if the lawyer's fee will exceed $1,000); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (requiring a lawyer to communicate the basis or rate of the lawyer's fee to be
communicated to a client "preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after
commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client
on the same basis or rate").
96. The text of the letter is loosely based on the form presented in PRICE & DONALDSON,
supra note 85, at 1-34 to -36.
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and final versions of estate-planning documents; supervise execution
of the final form of the documents; arrange any transfers of property
that are appropriate; and prepare any tax returns that may be required.
Based on my experience, the final version of your estate-planning
documents should be available within 30-45 days, assuming the pro-
cess is not significantly delayed at any point.
Fees and costs. You will be billed for our estate-planning ser-
vices when the work is completed [monthly, quarterly]. As I
explained when we met, the fee for our services will be based upon
the time actually required to prepare and implement your plans. In
order to carry out the work economically and efficiently, I may be
assisted by other lawyers and legal assistants in our firm. My time is
currently billed at $_ per hour; the time of my associates at
between $_ and $_ per hour; and the time of legal assistants at
$_ per hour. Our rates are usually adjusted in December of each
year, with the new rates taking effect on January 1. While the total
amount of our fee will depend on the number and length of our meet-
ings, the complexity of the plans you adopt, and the number of drafts
we prepare of various documents, based upon the information I now
have, I estimate that the total cost of formulating and implementing
your estate plans will be between $__ and $_ . Any
photocopying, communications, or delivery services will be billed to
you at cost.
Confidentiality. Any information we receive from either or both
of you may be shared with others in our office in order to carry out
our engagement. The information will not be communicated to
others, particularly persons outside our office, except to the extent we
believe is reasonably appropriate to share with your other advisors.
As between yourselves, you have agreed that there will be full and
complete disclosure of all information that is relevant and material to
our engagement, including information that one or both of you might
characterize as confidential. Accordingly, we may provide informa-
tion to one of you that we receive from the other regardless of the
time or manner in which it is communicated to us.
Conflicts. Each of you is free to develop an independent plan
for the disposition of your property. Some couples adopt plans that
are mirror images of each other, but others do not. We may represent
you both although you may differ regarding the manner in which you
each choose to dispose of your property. As between the two of you,
we will not advocate the interests of one of you over the other. We
may not be able to assist with matters in which your interests are
directly adverse, such as negotiating and defining your respective
interests in a property-status agreement. Should a serious conflict in
your interests develop, we may be required to withdraw from repre-
senting both of you.
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If the foregoing accurately expresses our agreement, please sign
and return the enclosed copy of this letter.
Sincerely,
We confirm the engagement of your firm on the foregoing terms:
Husband Wife
Date Date
An actual engagement letter might contain significantly different terms
regarding various matters, such as fees. For example, the lawyer and
clients might agree that the lawyer's compensation would be based on a
fixed fee rather than on hourly rates.97 The letter might also include
more detailed language regarding confidentiality, conflicts, or other
appropriate subjects.
CONCLUSION
The joint representation of multiple clients in estate planning is
generally appropriate and beneficial to clients. With the broader recog-
nition given to conflict waivers under Rule 1.7, joint representations are
somewhat more feasible. A lawyer should always exercise care in con-
sidering whether to accept multiple clients. Among other things, the
lawyer must explore fully with the prospective clients the ramifications
of a joint representation. In some instances they may rationally and rea-
sonably choose each to be represented by separate counsel. Most estate
planners would not agree to represent multiple clients in the same matter
pursuant to the separate regime. At the least, a lawyer should be
extremely wary of attempting to represent multiple clients separately if
the clients insist that each of them reserves the right to direct that some
information regarding the representation would not be shared with the
other client or clients.
97. For a fixed-fee sample form, see PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 85, at 1-35.
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